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NAO M I RO H T - A R R I A Z A*

Abstract
The arrest of the Chilean general Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in London in 1998, and decisions
in UK, Spanish, Belgian, and other European courts supporting his extradition, opened new
hope that prosecutions of international crimes in national courts under universal jurisdiction
laws might prove a viable strategy for combating impunity. Complainants brought cases in
a number of European countries, most notably Spain and Belgium. In Spain, the Supreme
Court eventually cut back on the reach of the universal jurisdiction law by superimposing the
requirement of a nationality tie to the forum, as well as modifying other prior jurisprudence. In
Belgium, the courts grappled with issues of immunity and the ability to initiate proceedings in
the absence of the defendant. Under US pressure the Belgian legislature eventually narrowed
and weakened the law. The article traces these developments, and concludes that advocates
need to be more strategic in choosing both the number and type of cases they present under
theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The primary criterion, the author argues, should be the
potential for the extraterritorial case to catalyze anti-impunity efforts in the territorial state.

Key words
Belgium; international crimes; international law in nationl courts; Spain; universal jurisdiction

The arrest of the Chilean general Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in London in 1998,
and rulings supporting his extradition to Spain on torture charges by the British
House of Lords and the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, kindled new hopes in victims’
associations and human rights advocates around the world. The 2001 jury trial and
conviction in Belgium of four Rwandans for their roles in the 1994 Rwandan genocide
showed that the courts of third-party states could bring to a successful conclusion
investigations into crimes against humanity committed half a world away. With
these precedents, advocates ﬁled an increasing number of requests for new transnational investigations. After all, formal amnesty laws or informal threats, bribes,
or other obstacles closed the courts of many countries to criminal investigations
or civil lawsuits involving abuses by local military or political leaders. The Pinochet
and Rwandan/Belgian precedents showed that transnational prosecutions could be
a viable alternative, and ﬁred imaginations around the world.
Cases began to arrive before the Spanish and Belgian courts, because their laws
allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction are the best known, and their procedural rules
allow victims a large degree of initiative in ﬁling and pursuing a criminal case.
The most promising cases before the Spanish courts involved Guatemala and Peru.
*
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Belgian cases initially involved Africans, among them Yerodia Ndombasi and other
ofﬁcials of the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Hissène Habré, the former dictator of Chad. Other courts also received transnational cases alleging torture, summary execution, and/or crimes against humanity.
The Dutch courts opened an investigation into Surinamese military head Desiré
Bouterse,1 the Senegalese looked into Habré’s crimes,2 and the French courts moved
against ofﬁcials from Mauritania and Congo (Brazzaville).3
Each of these cases, in its own way, came up against the political and legal
difﬁculties involved in transnational prosecutions, especially those against stillpowerful suspects. A string of judicial and legislative decisions has narrowed the
permissible scope of such prosecutions in Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. By
2003, these developments marked at least a temporary retreat from the optimism of
even a few years earlier.
Recent jurisprudence and legislation on universal jurisdiction brings to the fore
a number of key issues in making transnational prosecutions under universal jurisdiction a useful tool. These include the strength of the ties required between the
subject matter of the case and the forum state, the relationship between the ability
of the territorial state to hear the case and that of the forum state to proceed, the need
for the defendant to be present in the forum state for an investigation to be begun or
indictments issued, and the balance between the courts and the executive branch in
allowing a case to proceed. This article will focus on the Spanish and Belgian cases,
because the laws of those countries have been both the most widely used and the
most controversial. In Spain, developments have been limited to the courts, while
in Belgium court decisions were followed by legislative reform. In both cases, the
response to perceived theoretical problems of overlap and potential conﬂicts with
sovereignty was coloured by political pressure. In both cases, the response piled
overlapping restrictions on top of each other, hobbling but not killing the laws.

1. T HE S PANISH COURTS AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
JUDICIAL EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION
Spain’s law on universal jurisdiction was used in the 1980s and early 1990s against
narcotics smugglers and other common criminals, but was ﬁrst used in the context of mass violence in the 1996 cases against Argentine and Chilean military
ofﬁcers and civilians involved in those countries’ respective military dictatorships.
Article 23.4 of the Organic Law of Judicial Power allows for the prosecution of certain

1.

2.
3.

Bouterse Case, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Criminal Div., No. 00749/01 (CW 2323), Judgment of 18 Sept.
2001. For commentary, see J. K. Kleffner, ‘Jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes,
Torture and Terrorism in the Netherlands’, in A. Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Crimes internationaux et
jurisdictions nationales, étude comparée (2002).
Souleymane Guengueng et autres contre Hissène Habré, Cour de Cassation du Senegal, Première chambre statuant en matière pénale, Arrêt n’ 14 du 20-3-2001 Pénal, 20 March 2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/
french/themes/habre-cour de cass.html.
FIDH v. Ould Dah, Cour d’Appel de Montpellier, 25 May 2001; Case of Certain Criminal Proceedings in France
(Republic of the Congo v. France), application of 9 Dec. 2002, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
icof/icoforder/icof iapplication 20020209.pdf; Order of 17 June 2003, Request for Provisional Measures,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icoforder/icof iorder 20030617.PDF.
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crimes committed by non-Spaniards outside Spain, including genocide, terrorism,
and other crimes recognized in international treaties ratiﬁed by the Spanish government. Article 23.4 was incorporated into Spanish criminal law in 1985, but an
earlier version went back to the 1880s. Thus, while both the complaint and the
decision accepting it used international law liberally in justifying the court’s ability
to exercise its power, the case was ﬁrmly grounded in Spanish national law.
Despite the predominance of Spanish victims in the initial complaints, the cases
were not legally based on the nationality of the victims. Spanish law did not provide
for such passive personality jurisdiction. Rather, the early emphasis on Spanish
victims stemmed from general legal and political considerations. Legally, the Spanish
constitution requires judges to do justice on behalf of Spanish citizens, which might
make an investigating judge more likely to take on what would be likely to be an
unconventional, difﬁcult, and time-consuming case. Moreover, a judge who needed
to explain to colleagues or appeals courts why Spain had any business getting
involved in far-off, long-ago events would have an easier time of it if he could point
to Spanish victims as well as relying on any more abstract legal principle. Conversely,
the political branches of government would ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to explain why
Spanish courts should not be getting involved when Spanish citizens had been
harmed.
Spain also had a number of procedural advantages. Not only can a victim bring
a complaint directly to an investigating magistrate and ask for it to be pursued,
but the victim then becomes a party to the case and is able to follow the course of
the investigation and any subsequent trial. Even if the public prosecutor disagrees,
if the victim can convince the investigating magistrate that there is a valid case,
investigation can proceed. Plaintiffs can pursue civil damages in the course of the
proceedings, and rarely bring a separate civil case where criminal behaviour is at
issue. Even more expansively, Spain has very broad rules allowing people who are not
directly connected to an alleged crime to ﬁle complaints. These ‘popular accusers’
have to be reputable non-governmental groups concerned with the public interest.
They can ﬁle complaints, become party to cases, and even have privileged access to
the ﬁles and the ability to intervene at many stages of the proceedings.
Two investigating magistrates accepted the complaints against Argentine and
Chilean suspects, and the public prosecutor (representing the Spanish state) challenged the Spanish courts’ jurisdiction over the matters. The Audiencia Nacional
(AN – National Court), acting as a national appeals court, heard the jurisdictional
challenges. In November 1998, the court found that Spain could properly hear the
cases under Spain’s universal jurisdiction law.4 It upheld the genocide charges on
the grounds that the Genocide Convention, while it does not explicitly provide for
universal jurisdiction (only territorial and that of an international criminal court),
does not prohibit it.5 However, in a line of argument that was to prove problematic
later, the AN added that Article 6 of the Convention makes any non-listed kind of
4.
5.

Chilean Genocide Case, Audiencia Nacional, 5 Nov. 1998, reproduced in English in R. Brody and M. Ratner (eds.),
The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain (2000), 95. Both that case and the companion
Argentine case, dated 4 Nov. 1998, may be found in Spanish at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg.
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, entered into force 12 Jan. 1951,
78 UNTS 277. Article 6 states: ‘Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III
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jurisdiction secondary to those that are listed, so that, for instance, if a court in the
country where the crimes occurred were hearing the same case the forum state court
would have to defer. The AN found that the fact that the jurisdiction law dated from
1985 (i.e. after the alleged crimes took place) was not a bar to prosecution, since it
was procedural, not substantive, and thus applied as of the time of ﬁling the case.
The deﬁnition of the substantive offences clearly pre-dated the conduct at issue,
and so raised no ex post facto law problems. The AN also allowed the terrorism and
torture charges to go forward, and held that domestic amnesties in both Chile and
Argentina did not preclude a Spanish court hearing the case.
The AN’s decision allowed the attempted Spanish extradition of Augusto Pinochet
to go forward in the United Kingdom, although this was eventually denied due to
Pinochet’s ill-health and he returned home to Chile.6 It also permitted an indictment
against Adolfo Scilingo, an Argentine naval ofﬁcer accused of participating in ‘death
ﬂights’ while working in the infamous Naval Mechanics School (ESMA), arrested
when he travelled to Spain. A similar indictment against Ricardo Cavallo, another
ESMA operative accused of torture, became the basis of an extradition request to
Mexico, where Cavallo was arrested. In June 2003, he was extradited to Spain.7 Both
are now awaiting trial.
The decision also prompted a number of other complaints under the universal
jurisdiction provisions of Spanish law. Complaints against sitting heads of state
were quickly dismissed on immunity grounds; cases involving Guatemala and Peru,
however, seemed promising.
The ﬁrst involved the massacre of Mayan peasants and others in Guatemala during
the 1970s and 1980s. In December 1999, Nobel Peace Laureate Rigoberta Menchú,
together with groups of family members of the Guatemalan dead, Spanish labour
unions, and solidarity groups, ﬁled a complaint charging eight people with genocide,
terrorism, and torture. The suspects included ﬁve generals and a colonel, among them
former presidents, defence and interior ministers, and heads of the police. The most
notorious was General Efraı́n Rı́os Montt, who had taken power in a coup in March
1982 and over the next 18 months proceeded to wipe out hundreds of Mayan villages.
Rı́os Montt continued to dominate Guatemalan politics, as President of Congress
(and a losing presidential candidate in November 2003 elections). The complaint
included a number of unrelated incidents, including the death of Menchú’s own
family, the killing or disappearance of four Spanish priests, and a series of rural
massacres and urban disappearance cases.

6.
7.

shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory in which the act was committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’ The court approved the characterization of the acts as genocide against
a national group, on grounds that the victims had been targeted because of their group membership –
a group perceived as opposed to the national project of the military – which satisﬁed the intent of the
convention. The court also pointed out that, during the relevant time, Spain included ‘social group’ within
the deﬁnition of the groups covered by its genocide law.
On his return to Chile, Pinochet was indicted on disappearance and murder charges, and his immunity was
stripped by the courts in 2000. He was eventually found mentally unﬁt to stand trial.
Extradicción Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, Mexican Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, Amparo en Revisión
140/2002, 10 junio 2003, available at http://www.scjn.gob.mx/Asuntos/2003/Cavalloengrose(x)2.pdf. The
case is reproduced in English at (2003) 42 ILM 884.
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On 27 March 2000 Judge Guillermo Ruı́z Polanco accepted the complaint and
agreed to open an investigation. In his ruling the judge noted the connections to
Spain, and found that the accused each had direct responsibility for the crimes
charged.8 The judge, like Judge Baltasar Garzón in the Argentine cases, found that
Spanish jurisdiction was appropriate because the territorial courts had not acted.
While Guatemala had ‘original territorial jurisdiction’, it was not exclusive. ‘In the
absence of the honourable and effective exercise of jurisdiction it must be replaced
by courts – such as Spain’s – that uphold the universal prosecution of crimes against
human rights’, the judge wrote.
The Guatemalan complaint had a number of strengths. The magnitude of the
massacres was undeniable, and a UN-sponsored commission had already characterized the crimes as acts of genocide.9 The underlying acts at least in part concerned
Spain. On the other hand, far less was known in Spain about the Guatemalan case
than about Chile or Argentina, and Rı́os Montt had never gained the iconic status of
a Pinochet. In addition, unlike the Chilean 1978 amnesty law or the due obedience
and punto ﬁnal laws in Argentina, the 1996 amnesty law in Guatemala excluded
cases of genocide, torture, and disappearances.10 Impunity there was a matter of intimidation of witnesses and judges, threats, and corruption: de facto, not de jure. This
made it more difﬁcult to argue that the crimes could not be adequately investigated
in Guatemala.
As he had in the Argentine and Chilean cases, the public prosecutor appealed
against the grant of jurisdiction. Just before Christmas 2000, the Audiencia Nacional,
sitting as a whole, decided that ‘at this moment’ the Spanish courts had no jurisdiction over the alleged crimes, and that the case should be closed.11 The judges
gave two reasons: ﬁrst, while the Spanish courts could consider crimes of genocide
and terrorism that were committed elsewhere by non-Spaniards, there were limits.
If the Genocide Convention’s text had any meaning at all, it had to mean that any
non-enumerated jurisdiction was subsidiary to the enumerated territorial and international jurisdictions. The court drew the subsidiarity criterion from the text of the
treaty, and as derived from a concern for order in the international system: Spanish
law on its face imposed no such subsidiarity or exhaustion of domestic remedies
requirement. It merely required a defendant not to have been acquitted, pardoned,
or convicted in proceedings abroad.
The AN recognized that, as investigating magistrate Ruı́z Polanco found in the
Guatemalan case, at times the territorial courts did not provide an adequate forum.
There were two ways, they explained, in which the domestic courts could be inactive:
either there could be a legal impediment to prosecution, such as an amnesty law,
8.

Judge Ruı́z Polanco, Spanish Audiencia Nacional, decision of 27 March 2000. The basic documents to 2000
are contained in Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum, Jurisdicción Universal para el Juzgamiento del Genocidio en
Guatemala (2001).
9. Commission on Historical Clariﬁcation, Memory of Silence, English summary available at http://
hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/english.
10. Law of National Reconciliation, Decree 145-96, 18 Dec. 1996, available at http: \\minugua.guate.net/
ACUERDOSDEPAZ/ACUERDOSESPA%DIOL/LEY9620RECONCILIATION.htm.
11. Guatemala Genocide Case, Audiencia Nacional decision of 13 Dec. 2000, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihlnat.nsf and http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala.
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or judges could be ‘subject to pressure from ofﬁcial or de facto powers that create a
climate of intimidation or fear making it impossible to carry out the judicial function
with the serenity and impartiality required’. In the Guatemalan case, the National
Reconciliation (amnesty) law created no legal impediment to the prosecution of
genocide. As for de facto impediments, the court found that peace had only recently
come to Guatemala – with the publication of the Truth Commission’s report – and
that there was nothing in the record to suggest that in the new postwar period judges
would be intimidated into rejecting the Guatemalans’ complaints were they to be
lodged at home. In the Argentine and Chilean cases, the passage of time had made
judicial inaction clear, but here it was too soon to tell. Therefore, ‘for the moment’,
the Spanish courts should stay out of the case.
It was easy to conclude that the AN was uninterested in broadening the Spanish
forum beyond the Southern Cone cases. The Spanish Supreme Court was widely
considered to be more conservative than the AN, and an appeal risked losing not
just the Guatemalan case, but the earlier cases as well. What is more, the AN had left
the door open to the complainants to provide more evidence that the local courts
could not, or would not, hear the cases, and to move to reopen before the Spanish
investigating magistrate. Nonetheless, the complainants’ lawyers were anxious to
push the law forward. They appealed.
On 25 February 2003, more than two years after the AN decision, the Spanish
Supreme Court, by a vote of eight to seven, overturned in part the lower court
decision and restricted Spain’s universal jurisdiction law.12 The court allowed the
complainants a small victory: it reopened those cases, such as the Spanish embassy
massacre and the deaths of the Spanish priests, where there was a clear tie to Spain.
But the victory came at a high price. The court held that only cases with such a tie, for
example the nationality of the victim or the presence of the offender, could proceed.
Moreover, the tie had to be present in the principal charges against the defendant,
not just in related or ancillary ones. For that reason, all the genocide and terrorism
charges were invalid, since there had been no genocide aimed at Spanish citizens
per se. Only the torture charges, to the extent that they involved Spanish citizens,
could stand, because the Convention Against Torture allows for passive personality
jurisdiction.
For the majority, Spanish law had to conform to other principles of international law, including respect for other states’ sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states. Extraterritorial jurisdiction, when
not authorized by the United Nations or speciﬁcally regulated by treaty, required
a point of contact with national interests to create legitimacy and rationality in
international relations. The majority found that point of contact, given by nationality or presence, to be a jurisdictional prerequisite.
The seven dissenters found the majority’s approach too restrictive and, therefore,
incompatible with the treatment of genocide as a grave crime under internal and
12. Guatemala Genocide Case, Judgement, Supreme Court of Spain, 25 Feb. 2003, available in English at (2003) 42
ILM 683, and in Spanish at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guate. The holding of the case was reafﬁrmed by
the decision of the Supreme Court of 8 March 2004 in the case of Chilean general Hernán Brady.
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international law. The majority decision, they argued, ignored the legislative intent
and the language of the Organic Law of Judicial Power section 23.4, as well as
international law. It confused passive personality and universal jurisdiction, left any
extraterritorial prosecution of genocide practically impossible, misconstrued the
statute to confuse its treaty-based section (g) with the more general provisions on
genocide, terrorism, and other crimes, and converted the minimum requirements
of treaties into a maximum.
The dissent answered the majority’s concern about the potential chaos in the
international system posed by concurrent jurisdictions by superimposing a necessity criterion. If the domestic courts were doing their job, there was no need
for extraterritorial intervention. That decision, however, could not be based on a
judgement about the court’s inactivity, which was too hard to measure and too
politically charged at an early stage in the proceedings. Rather, any limits had to
come from a ﬂexible, prudent rule of reason aimed merely at practical concerns
such as the effectiveness of an investigation and extradition request, discouraging
a proliferation of unrelated claims, or a heavy burden on the Spanish courts. For
the dissenters, a tie to Spain was merely an aid in applying this rule of reason,
not a jurisdictional prerequisite. In this case, historic, social, linguistic, and jurisprudential ties linked Spain and Guatemala. The crimes at issue involved Spanish citizens, not as victims of genocide but as victims targeted because they defended others from genocide. There would never be a more compelling case. ‘If
there is no nexus in this case, then a nexus requirement becomes a mere pretext
to exclude or suppress universal jurisdiction in all genocide cases’, the dissenters
wrote.
The plenary Supreme Court’s decision revolved around the appropriate ties
between the forum state and the subject matter of the case. In an attempt to
avoid becoming a forum for too many unrelated cases, and to sort out what it
saw as a potential source of confusion, the Court drew a very tight nexus requirement. Subsequent cases have taken care to establish the nexus with Spain.
For example, when Judge Garzón indicted Osama bin Laden and 34 others on
charges of terrorist activities connected to the al Qaeda network, he established
Spain’s jurisdiction because Spain served as a place or base for resting, preparation,
indoctrinating, support, and ﬁnancing of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the
United States.13
On 8 March 2004 a panel of the Spanish Supreme Court reafﬁrmed its Guatemala
holding in a case involving Chilean general Hernán Brady.14 The repetition means
that its limited view of universal jurisdiction now has jurisprudential value,15 and
will most likely be followed when the Court considers challenges to Spanish jurisdiction in the pending trials of Argentine torturers Adolfo Scilingo and Ricardo

13.
14.

See, e.g., ‘Osama bin Laden Indicted in Spain in 9–11 Attacks’, Associated Press, 18 Sept. 2003.
Fallo del Tribunal Supremo en el caso del Gral. chileno Hernán J. Brady Roche. Recurso de Casación
no. 1812/2002, 8 March 2004.
15. Article 1(6) of the Civil Code holds that jurisprudence in the form of court decisions complements doctrine
when the Supreme Court has established it ‘repeatedly’.
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Cavallo.16 That result would allow trial to proceed, since there were numerous victims of Spanish descent killed or disappeared in the Naval Mechanics School (ESMA),
where the two men worked.
In a subsequent case involving Peru, a panel of the same court returned to the
related ‘subsidiarity’ issue. Motivated by the same concerns, that strand of law also focuses on the appropriateness of third-state intervention, but this time asking whether
there is a need for a transnational court to act based on inactivity or closing of the
territorial forum rather than on links to the forum state. On 20 May 2003, a threejudge panel of the Spanish Supreme Court afﬁrmed the dismissal of a case alleging
genocide, terrorism, torture, and arbitrary detention against former presidents Alan
Garcı́a and Alberto Fujimori, ex-General Montecinos and other high-ranking government ofﬁcials in Peru.17 The Peruvian complaint, like the Guatemalan, was based
on the universal jurisdiction provisions of Spanish law, and argued that the Peruvian
courts were not investigating the crimes. The panel’s decision backtracked slightly
from the harshness of the majority’s ruling in the Guatemala case. It reafﬁrmed
the Spanish courts’ ability to judge genocide cases based on universal jurisdiction,
reafﬁrmed the AN’s rulings in the Argentine and Chilean cases, and left intact the
possibility of trial in the pending cases of Argentine torturers.
The panel focused on the argument that the Spanish courts were ‘subsidiary’ to
the territorial courts or an international criminal court. In the Guatemalan case,
the majority had criticized the lower court’s two-pronged (formal amnesty or fear
and intimidation) ‘subsidiarity’ argument. The Supreme Court had earlier found in
the Guatemala case that judicial inquiry into the actual availability of an alternative
forum was inappropriate, because it ‘implies a judgement of one state’s courts about
the ability to administer justice of the similarly situated organs of another sovereign
state’.18 This might be appropriate for the International Criminal Court (ICC), but
not a national court. The dissent agreed on this point, ﬁnding that both the Genocide
Convention and Spanish law allow concurrent, not subsidiary jurisdiction, so long
as the suspect has not been convicted, acquitted, or pardoned elsewhere.
The panel in the Peru case characterized the issue as one not of subsidiarity
but of the ‘principle of necessity of jurisdictional intervention’,19 along the lines
of the dissent in the Guatemala case. In other words, the possibility of universal
jurisdiction permitted, although not speciﬁed, in the Genocide Convention, entails
a need to prioritize among states that could simultaneously have jurisdiction over
the same events. In doing so, the Court looked to whether the territorial courts are
exercising effective jurisdiction. To evaluate effectiveness, the courts should simply
look at whether the events at issue were in fact the subject of prosecution, without
attempting to analyze the reasons or to evaluate the existence of a state of de facto

16.

Ricardo Cavallo was extradited from Mexico and ordered to be detained pending trial by the AN on 29 June
2003. Adolfo Scilingo was arrested in Madrid, and his case was ordered ready for trial on 27 June 2003. Both
men have appealed to the Supreme Court.
17. Peruvian Genocide Case, Supreme Court of Spain, Penal Chamber, 20 May 2003, available at http://www.
universaljurisdiction.info/index/128118.
18. Guatemala case, supra note 12.
19. Peruvian Genocide Case, supra note 14.
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impunity. This is a far more workable rule – perhaps the only rule that avoids having
a court evaluate the efﬁcacy of its counterparts in another country. In the Peruvian
case, investigations against several of the defendants were proceeding in local courts,
and suspects were in jail or had ﬂed the jurisdiction (the case with former President
Fujimori). Thus, for the time being, Spanish prosecution was inappropriate.
The Spanish Supreme Court thus avoided the complications of passing judgement
on the functionality of another state’s legal system, choosing what seemed to it
a workable bright-line rule. However, it also left intact the underlying problem:
judging de facto impunity. In many cases territorial courts can have investigations
open for years that go nowhere because of lack of resources or political will, or due
to corruption or the intimidation of lawyers, witnesses, and judges. It is unclear at
what point the passage of time will lead to a ﬁnding that no effective jurisdiction
exists. If genocide is difﬁcult to prosecute in a domestic court precisely because of
the ability of powerful defendants to subvert local judicial processes, it would seem
the Spanish solution could in some cases favour impunity in the interests of a clear,
bright-line rule.

2. B ELGIUM : JUDICIAL ADVANCE , LEGISLATIVE RETREAT
A 1993 law gave Belgian courts jurisdiction over 20 speciﬁc war crimes (grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols), no matter where committed or by whom.20 The Belgian courts’ universal jurisdiction could be triggered
by a victim acting as complainant, and it did not require the defendant’s presence
in Belgium to open an investigation. Immunity was also not a problem, since the
Belgian law clearly stated that no immunities to investigation applied in cases involving war crimes. The law was passed with little debate, as a way of belatedly
making Belgium’s acceptance of the conventions meaningful in a domestic criminal
context. A year later, almost a million people were slaughtered in Rwanda. Belgium
investigated and convicted four Rwandans resident in Belgium for crimes committed
during the course of the 1994 genocide.21 The Belgian courts also investigated, and
requested the extradition of, Augusto Pinochet once he was detained in London.22
Lingering guilt over Belgium’s role in Rwanda’s tortured history, added to the desire to bring local law into compliance with the impending International Criminal
Court, led to a 1999 expansion of the law, also without controversy, to cover crimes
against humanity and genocide.23
In the wake of the Pinochet and Rwandan cases, new complaints arrived. A group of
Chadian former detainees, some resident in Belgium, brought a complaint against
20.

Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la repression des infractions graves aux Conventions internationals de Genève
du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocols I et II du 8 juin 1977, Additionnels à ces Conventions, Moniteur belge, 5 Aug.
1993.
21. Public Prosecutor v. Alphonse Higaniro et al., Assize Court of Brussels, 8 June 2001. For a summary, see
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh72.htm.
22. Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels (J. Vandermeersch), Order of 6 Nov. 1998, reproduced in (1999) Revue de
Droit Pénal et de Criminologie 278.
23. Law Concerning the Punishment of Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law, (1999) 38 ILM 918.

383

384

NAO M I RO H T - A R R I A Z A

Hissène Habré, the former president. From 1982 to 1990 Habré had periodically
targeted various ethnic groups, ordered the killing of political prisoners, and had
run a political police force accused of torture and murder. A subsequent Truth
Commission accused him of committing crimes against humanity, although it
was unable to investigate fully. A Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime had compiled dossiers on 792 cases, but had been unable to
advance domestic prosecutions. Habré ﬂed in 1990 to Senegal. Senegal initially
opened an investigation, but, under heavy political pressure, an appeals court dismissed the case in July 2000. The court, its ruling afﬁrmed by the Cour de Cassation (the highest court), held that the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention
Against Torture could not be applied to pre-ratiﬁcation conduct and that customary
international law could not alone serve as the basis of a criminal complaint.24 With
that, the complainants turned to Belgium. Belgian investigating magistrate Daniel
Fransen travelled to Chad in 2002 to interview witnesses and collect documents.
Eventually, with domestic complaints against Habré-era ofﬁcials mounting and under signiﬁcant pressure, the Chadian government agreed not to oppose Habré’s
prosecution in Belgium. Senegal likewise agreed to hold Habré under arrest at his
Senegal home until Belgium could properly request his extradition. That case remains open and trial is pending.25
Another complaint, originally ﬁled in November 1998 (at the same time as the
Belgian complaint against Pinochet), charged Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity. The complainants were Congolese resident
in Belgium; ﬁve were Belgian citizens. They charged that, as part of the efforts of the
administration of Laurent Kabila to expel an ethnically Tutsi rebel force in the eastern DRC, senior government ofﬁcials, including Kabila himself, Yerodia Ndombasi
and two others, had publicly called for acts of violence against the ‘invaders’. Some
of their incendiary speeches were captured in television recordings. Their calls were
soon answered by a wave of lynching, arrests, and persecution of Tutsis throughout
the DRC.
After a year’s investigation and with the approval of the state prosecutor, on
11 April 2000 Judge Vandermeersch issued an arrest warrant for Yerodia Ndombasi as
author or co-author of war crimes and crimes against humanity. There was only one
small problem: at the time he issued the warrant (although not when the acts took
place) Yerodia Ndombasi was Foreign Minister of the DRC. Judge Vandermeersch
recognized the potential difﬁculties for a Foreign Minister trying to do his job with
an Interpol warrant out for his arrest. He noted that while under the Belgian law
there was no reason to preclude the ability of the courts to try the case, execution of
any arrest warrant had to be stayed while the suspect was a state representative on
an ofﬁcial visit. To do otherwise would impermissibly interfere with international

24.

Court of Appeals of Dakar, 4 July 2000, afﬁrmed Court of Cassation, 20 March 2001. The decisions,
and commentary, are available in French at http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/habre-decision.htm;
http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/habre-cour de cass.htm.
25. See http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/VerwilghenLetter.jpg.
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diplomacy and tread on the rights of the state, not just the individual.26 However,
there was a point to issuing the warrant even if it could not be executed: it allowed
the judge to compile a dossier of information about the alleged crime that would
be available once the defendant no longer held a diplomatic post. Vandermeersch
notiﬁed the DRC courts of the case, but (not surprisingly) they made no effort to
open their own investigation.
The DRC did react, however. In October 2000 the DRC government ﬁled its own
complaint with the International Court of Justice. It accused Belgium of overstepping
its authority, violating the customary law principle that a state may not exercise its
authority on the territory of another state, and trampling on the rules about the
immunity from prosecution of foreign ministers. It asked the court to tell Belgium
to quash the arrest warrant.
The ICJ decision, handed down on 14 February 2002, ordered Belgium to rescind
the arrest warrant and found for the DRC. Against the wishes of some of the judges,
it did not deal with the question of whether universal jurisdiction could apply at all
when the suspect was not present in the country. Instead, the decision focused on the
issue of immunity, ﬁnding that incumbent foreign ministers enjoyed a functional
immunity from civil or criminal proceedings in another country, whether or not the
charges involved international crimes.27
While the International Court of Justice declined to grapple with the issue of
whether the law on universal jurisdiction included a presence requirement, the
Belgian courts could not avoid it. The issue came to a head in the Yerodia case,28
and again, more spectacularly, three months later, in the complaint against Ariel
Sharon. In June 2001, 23 complainants, only one resident in Belgium, ﬁled under the
1993/99 Belgian law an application against Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel,
and Amos Yaron, Director-General of the Israeli Defence Ministry. The complaint
alleged that during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon Sharon, the then Defence
Minister, Yaron, then the local commander of the Israeli Defence Forces, and others
had committed war crimes by allowing Lebanese militiamen to murder hundreds
of innocent civilians in the Sabra and Shatila camps. As evidence, they pointed to
an Israeli commission of inquiry that had found Sharon ‘indirectly responsible’.29
The Belgian investigating magistrates recognized full well the explosive political implications of investigating Israel’s head of state, but felt constrained by the
requirements of Belgian criminal procedure to open an investigation ﬁle, after ﬁrst
getting the approval of the state prosecutor. The decision set off a minor ﬁrestorm.
Sharon denounced the Belgian courts and announced that he would no longer travel
to Belgium. Belgium assumed the rotating presidency of the European Union in July
2001, but the investigation of Sharon was a major obstacle to Belgium’s being able
Tribunal of ﬁrst instance of Brussels, 11 April, 2000, cited by the ICJ in Arrest Warrant Case, (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgement of 14 Feb. 2002, (2003) 41 ILM 536, also at http://www.icj-cij.org.
27. Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 21. For commentary, see, e.g., L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International
and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2003), 227.
28. Arret de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, Chambre de mises en accusation of Brussels, 16 April 2002.
29. The complaint is available at http://www.indictsharon.net. The Kahan Commission report may be found
at Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, 8 February 1983,
http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFA0ign0.
26.
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to play a role in peace talks. Criticism mounted. The Sharon case seemed the worst
possible test case: a high-proﬁle and controversial defendant who was a current
head of state, no ties to Belgium to speak of, no co-operation from the state where
the defendant resided or where the crimes were committed. It was unclear whether
the case could be heard in Lebanon, which had an amnesty law in place. As Israel
pointed out, the Israelis had investigated, Sharon had lost his job, and there had been
at least an implicit decision that criminal prosecution was not warranted. On the
other hand, there was a good deal of evidence tying the suspects to the crimes. How
could the complainants’ lawyers tell their clients that their suffering and the loss of
their family members was too politically sensitive to warrant trying to gain redress
in any possible forum?
The Acting Attorney General of Brussels sought an interlocutory ruling on the
courts’ ability to proceed. Given the recent ICJ ruling in the Yerodia case, the easiest
solution for the Belgian Court of Appeal seemed to be to quash the warrant on
immunity grounds. Human rights lawyers worried that the court would go further
and overturn the universal jurisdiction law altogether. In the end, the court did
neither. In a 26 June 2002 decision, the court ﬁrst reafﬁrmed that a law establishing
Belgian jurisdiction over international crimes committed outside Belgium by nonBelgians was not per se invalid.30 However, the courts could only exercise jurisdiction
if the defendant was already present in Belgium.
The court found a presence requirement in an 1878 criminal procedure code (in
Article 12, to be exact) which, with modiﬁcations, was still in effect. In passing
the 1993 and then the 1999 law, the Belgian legislature was presumed to know
about the provisions of the criminal procedure code, and if they had at the time
chosen not to change those provisions explicitly, it had to be because they intended
the universal jurisdiction law only to apply when the defendant was in Belgium.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Belgian law, the court found, was to the
contrary; a proposed 2001 change in the law had not yet taken effect. Nor did any
of Belgium’s treaty commitments require action when the defendant was not found
in Belgium; indeed, the treaties indicated a preference for domestic prosecutions,
leaving extraterritorial jurisdiction for cases where the defendant had not been
found at home. Ariel Sharon, presumably, like Yerodia, was not present in Belgium.
In that case, the court found, the case could not be heard and should be dismissed.
The Court of Cassation in February 2003 in part reversed this ruling.31 It conﬁrmed
the dismissal against Sharon himself, this time on immunity grounds. However, it
allowed the case against other defendants, including Amos Yaron, to go forward,
without requiring the defendants’ presence.
Under political pressure from all sides, the Belgian legislature began debating
how to amend the law to keep it essentially intact while avoiding potential excesses.
At ﬁrst, the discussion focused on the relationship with the ICC, and on possibly
requiring greater ties between Belgium and the complainants – the Spanish solution.

30. Sharon and others, 10th Chamber, Appeals Court of Brussels, 26 June 2002, available at http://sabrashatila.be/documents/arrest020626.pdf.
31. Belgian Court of Cassation, 12 Feb. 2003, available at http://indictsharon.net.
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In April 2003 the legislature passed a group of modest amendments aimed at streamlining and clarifying the law.
The question of whether a defendant needs to be present within the jurisdiction of
the court, and at what stage, goes to the heart of what universal jurisdiction is about.
Can a court investigate, issue a warrant, request the extradition of the defendant,
and satisfy the presence requirement through extradition? At what point in that
sequence does the defendant have to be there? Or is presence acting merely as a
proxy for ties to the forum?
If the defendant has to be present for the judicial process to begin, it will be difﬁcult
ever to get to the arrest stage, since former dictators and torturers are unlikely to
linger somewhere long enough for a conscientious judge to put a dossier together,
at least once they get wind of an investigation. Universal jurisdiction under that
scenario will still play a constructive role, but its function will be to ensure that
dictators stay at home and that there is ‘no safe haven’ for such people, not to see
that they are actually brought to justice. Nor can courts put together the evidence
and testimony that might jump-start a domestic prosecution if the ‘investigate and
extradite’ route is closed. Under a ‘presence of the defendant’ rule, the Pinochet case
would never have happened. British human rights groups had tried four times to
start a prosecution against him on various of his visits to the United Kingdom,
but each time he had left before the slow machinery of the justice system (and the
requisite political will) could be brought to bear. Without the Spanish extradition
request, it would have been much more difﬁcult to kick-start that machinery into
operation.
The Sharon case raised the proﬁle of Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law and
its potential for discomﬁting the powerful. More high-proﬁle cases appeared. In the
context of the US build-up to war in Iraq and ﬁerce European opposition to it, a group
of Iraqis in March 2003 sued former president George H. W. Bush, Vice President Dick
Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and retired general Norman Schwarzkopf
for bombing an air raid shelter in Baghdad over a decade before.32 In May, another
Iraq-related complaint accused General Tommy Franks and other US ofﬁcials of war
crimes committed during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 33
Reform of the law, under way since April, now became politically urgent. US
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld blustered that he would oppose building expansion and might even pull NATO headquarters out of Brussels. Anti-universal
jurisdiction laws modelled on the anti-ICC law were introduced in the US Congress.
Belgium’s recently elected coalition government tried vainly to resist the pressure,
but quickly gave in and proposed a package of modiﬁcations that left the law far less
sweeping – and far less useful.34 The modiﬁed law gives immunity to heads of state,
heads of government, and foreign affairs ministers. It tightens the required contacts
with the forum state, allowing the Belgian courts to hear complaints only when the
suspect is Belgian or lives in Belgium, the complainants are Belgian or have lived
32. ‘Plainte pour crime de guerre contre Bush père’, Le Soir en Ligne, 18 March 2003.
33. The complaint is available at http://www.stopusa.be/1Campagne/proces-Franks/PROCES-Complaint
Against Tommy Franks.htm
34. Loi relative des violations graves du droit international humanitaire, 5 Aug. 2003, Moniteur Belge, 7 Aug. 2003,
20506.
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there legally for three years at the time of the alleged crimes, or if a treaty requires
Belgium to exercise jurisdiction. In addition, it removes the ability of the victim
to initiate proceedings that made the Belgian forum particularly accessible. The
decision to proceed now rests entirely with the state prosecutor: the investigating
magistrate cannot act based solely on a partie civile-initiated complaint. Finally, and
most problematically, the prosecutor must reject a complaint if, under the concrete
facts, the case should be heard by a court with international jurisdiction or in the
place where the crimes were committed or where the suspects are found, so long
as the alternative jurisdiction is independent and impartial. Thus the Belgian law
takes up the Spanish idea that universal jurisdiction is merely subsidiary to that
of the territorial courts, but does so in a way that leaves much more discretion to
the state prosecutor. The Belgian solution combines the problematic elements of
deﬁning properly the relationship of the territorial and extraterritorial courts with
those of having executive branch rather than judicial ofﬁcers choosing whether
to go forward. The result is a high degree of ill-deﬁned discretion left to ofﬁcials
susceptible to political pressures.

3. C ONCLUSIONS
Along a number of different axes, the law has been reduced and tightened up. Both
judges and legislators seem to be reacting to a sense that universal jurisdiction
without speciﬁed limits is too unbounded, too subject to confusion, when more
than one jurisdiction can prosecute the same course of conduct. Faced with the
theoretical possibility of multiple prosecutions for the same course of action, in
an effort to create an orderly process of prioritization Spain and Belgium, through
different means, have in effect superimposed a nationality tie (or at least something
close to it) on something they are still calling universal jurisdiction. But presumably
the reason universal jurisdiction exists at all is because the crimes involved are of
concern to all states. By their very deﬁnition and nature, they transcend the realm
of territorial sovereignty. If so, why should any additional tie be a jurisdictional
prerequisite? Practical concerns over the ability to extradite, to obtain witnesses
or information, or otherwise to try the case may require prosecutors and judges to
exercise a prudential course of restraint where there are no ties to the forum, but
that is very different from a bright-line jurisdictional rule. The difference between
the ‘rule of reason’ of the Spanish Supreme Court dissenters, and the jurisdictional
prerequisite of the majority and of the Belgian legislator, is the difference between
limited universal jurisdiction and a jurisdiction that is universal in name only.
The easiest explanation for these setbacks is political pressure, especially from
the United States. It is doubtful whether the cases against US ofﬁcials would have
ever moved beyond a preliminary stage. Rather, the threat to the United States
came from the validation of the idea of international justice, the right of courts
outside the United States to investigate certain alleged international crimes if committed by US nationals, even without the consent of the United States. Thus the
furious reaction to the Franks suit was more about the US campaign against the
ICC than the merits of the charges. Similarly, the conservative Aznar government in Spain never supported the universal jurisdiction cases, and its pro-US
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tilt in 2003 simply accentuated that antipathy. Spanish judges could not fail to
notice.
This is, however, a partial truth. It is also true that by targeting highly visible
current heads of state, by aiming at the leaders of powerful, unpopular countries
such as the United States and Israel, and by simultaneously bringing dozens of
cases without ﬁrst creating an adequate jurisprudential base, activists and lawyers
overloaded a new, controversial, and fragile process. A more prudent approach would
have built up a jurisprudence from the bottom, starting with cases with clear ties to
the forum state and with less explosive political baggage. These cases would have
taken time to build a constituency in both the forum and territorial states adequate
to withstand the inevitable political pressures. They would have been chosen, not
just with an eye to the political and publicity effect, but for the real possibilities for
unblocking or catalyzing debate and eventual court action. Building on precedent
may be a concept more familiar to common-law lawyers than to civil lawyers.
Nonetheless, while the legal principles may differ, the political considerations are
similar.
I am not here complaining about ‘politicization’ of the process. Most human
endeavour is marked by multiple agendas and interests, and these cases were no
different. But a strategic, co-ordinated approach to building a law viable in the
long-term ﬁght against impunity seems to have been missing, perhaps inevitably so
given the decentralized, opportunistic nature of these cases. The result is an at least
temporary retreat from the promise of global justice.
Does this mean that universal jurisdiction, once touted as a harbinger of a more
just international legal order, is useless? Far from it. But I suggest that its utility
does not come solely, or even mainly, from the ability to capture dictators and torturers. Nor does it come from the possible deterrence value, either on atrocities or,
more modestly, on post-atrocity travel by perpetrators. These effects would be difﬁcult to measure in any case. Rather, the primary value lies in the ability of a transnational investigation based on universal jurisdiction to prompt investigations and
prosecutions at home, in the territorial state. Some cases did this: the Pinochet litigation undoubtedly changed for ever Chile’s domestic political and legal landscape.
The investigations into Argentine military atrocities prompted new investigations,
judicial and legislative annulments of the amnesty law, and a new willingness to
extradite human rights offenders if they are not tried domestically. The Habré case
seems to have had similar catalytic effects in Chad. The story of how and why these
cases produced such effects is beyond the scope of this article.35
These cases all had close links to the forum state, so that reforms simply requiring
a showing of such links would not have changed them. Other reforms, especially
those vesting discretion in the executive branch to decide when a case may be
appropriately transferred to the territorial state, might well have proved fatal. As
we move forward, advocates would do well to measure potential cases against the
goal of jump-starting domestic processes, even as they inevitably assay strategies to
overcome this most recent series of limitations.
35.
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